Space. The final frontier. Not so, say the doyennes of the first generation Internet community, who view themselves as the new fron tiersmen and women staking out a previously unexplored territorycyberspace. Numerous metaphors in the Internet literature picture cyberspace as a new, previously unexplored domain. Parallels are fre quently drawn to the American colonies, the Western frontier, or outer space. In Code: And Other Laws of Cy berspace, Lawrence Lessig1 says, "Cyberspace is a place. People live there."2 In this place, we will build a "new society" (p. 4). A sense of this background is helpful in appraising Lessig's claims. While they are in that place, cyberspace, they are also here. They are at a terminal screen, eating chips, ignoring the phone. They are downstairs on the computer, late at night, while their husbands are asleep. They are at work, or at cyber cafes, or in a computer lab. They live this life there, while here. And then at some point in the day, they jack out, and are only here. They step up from the machine, in a bit of a daze; they tum around. They have re turned. Lawrence Lessig, Th e Zones of Cy berspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1403 (1996) (footnote omitted).
He argues that "we" need a "constitution" for cyberspace.3 This seems reasonable, a new social compact for a new society. 4 While Lessig has his legal training in the U.S. system, as a former law clerk to Justice Antonin Scalia and a recognized American consti tutional law scholar, in Co de, he uses the word "constitution" in its British rather than its American sense.5 For the British, a constitution is an unwritten common understanding about fundamental social val ues and social practices that merits institutional protection from the vicissitudes of ordinary poiitics.6 The purview of Lessig's project, then, is constitutional theory understood as the theory of social order, a broader inquiry than the top-down, text-based American constitu tional theory.7
3. See p. 5 ("We build a world where freedom can flourish not by removing from society any self-conscious control; we build a world where freedom can flourish by setting it in a place where a particular kind of self-conscious control survives. We build liberty, that is, as our founders did, by setting society upon a certain constitution."). Lessig appears to use "we " to mean both Americans and some undefined larger group: "We should understand that we are part of a worldwide political battle; that we have views about what rights should be guaranteed to all humans, regardless of their nationality; and that we should be ready to press these views in this new political space opened up by the Net. " P. 205.
4. I would argue instead that we have a constitution for cyberspace already. It is the one written on parchment and displayed at the National Archives. Things are, of course, com plicated by the fact that the Internet is a global phenomenon. But just because a phenome non is global does not mean that the Constitution cedes jurisdiction over those elements that have significant impact within the United States. The Internet is revolutionary, but physical borders still matter, and will continue to, for the foreseeable future. See Jack Goldsmith, Regulation of the In ternet: Th ree Persistent Fa llacies, 13 CHl:.-KENT L. REV. 1119, 1124 (1998). In general, Lessig agrees that real space jurisdiction matters for cyberspace regula tion. P. 190.
5. See p. 5 ("But by 'constitution' I don't mean a legal text .. .. Rather, as the British understand when they speak of their constitution, I mean an architecture -not just a legal text but a way of life -that structures and constrains social and legal power, to the end of protecting fundamental values -principles and ideals that reach beyond the compromises of ordinary politics. "). (Vol. 98:1916 Lessig implores us to begin the search for a way of life in cyber space that protects "fundamental values" (p. 6). Either we do so very soon, he insists, or we risk locking ourselves into an architecture of computer code that will destroy liberty,8 as a by-product of promoting the interests of global electronic commerce.9 Given the libertarian leanings of the Internet community,10 it is ironic, Lessig observes, that the forces of the market, Adam Smith's invisible hand, will wield the hammer.11 After all, it is the libertarian creed that markets create lib erty, not destroy it. According to Lessig, the overly zealous commit ment ta libertarianism on the part of the first-generation community blinds them to this threat, however.
While Lessig paints a foreboding picture of the dark clouds of op pression gathering on the online horizon, he notes as well that a brighter future is possible.12 Code is by nature mutable and may be used to secure a constitutional structure for cyberspace that promotes political freedom. Lessig contends that we as a society have yet to re alize that a choice must be made with regard to the degree of liberty we want in cyberspace (pp. 6-7). The goal is to choose-from among all the possible cyberspaces -the one with an architectural code that best promises to support liberty and other fundamental values we choose to import into cyberspace (p. 6).
Lessig goes so far as to say "[c]ode is law" (pp. 6, 59). Taken at face value, this is an extraordinary claim, given the dominance of posi- This book is about that change, and about how we might prevent it."); see also RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 6-15 (1982) (discussing the "back of the invisible hand").
12. See p. 6 ("We can build, or architect, or code cyberspace to protect values that we believe are fundamental, or we can build, or architect, or code cyberspace to allow those values to disappear.").
tivism in modern jurisprudence.13 Whatever Lessig's overall jurispru dence of cyberspace, one thing is certain; conceiving of code as law makes the choice of code political. Indeed, for Lessig, as for his intel lectual forebears, code is quintessentially political.14 One of the book's most important contributions is that it raises the basic and crucial proposition regarding the normativity of code to a new level of sophis tication, demonstrating the applicability of the thesis to issues of pri vacy, speech, and other core constitutional values (pp. 109-209).
Lessig has written the first book devoted to the political theory of computer code. "Code," as the term is used by Lessig, refers, how ever, both to computer code -the code written by programmersand to legal code -the code written by legislators. One of the book's leitmotifs is a comparison between the properties of computer code and those of legal code, or, as Lessig quips, "West Coast code" versus "East Coast code" (p. 53). The overarching similarity is that both regulate human behavior.
The regulation of human behavior, "regulability," is a second key topic of the book. Regulability refers to the "capacity of a govern ment to regulate behavior within its proper reach."15 On the account Lessig develops, there are four important regulators of behavior: law, norms, architecture, and markets (pp. 87-89). Lessig argues that in cy berspace, network computer architecture is a "newly powerful regula tor" of human behavior (p. 86). Nevertheless, a full account of the so cial order of cyberspace requires an examination of the interplay of all four regulatory forces.
Code's main normative thesis is that we must resist the migration toward a more regulable Internet. More specifically, Lessig argues for a "commons" in the key architectural code of cyberspace (p. 8 carries its source code along with the object code, modifications are more easily possible. Lessig is an unabashed proponent of the open source code movement, which he sees as revolutionary (p. 8). Open code will make cyberspace less regulable because it puts coding in the hands of more people, and, thus, code will be less subject to central ized control.16 Lessig conceptualizes the situation in constitutional terms. The citizenry will be safe from the tyranny of government only if the awesome potential for power held by code is distributed broadly among the programming world rather than concentrated in a small number of hands.17
Lessig's overall argument is spread throughout the book's seven teen chapters, which are divided into four parts. The main arguments of Code, which will be the focus of this Review, are set out in Parts 1 and 2, entitled "Regulability," and "Code and Other Regulators." Part 3, entitled "Applications," applies the arguments of Parts 1 and 2 to four important issues: intellectual property, privacy, free speech, and sovereignty. Part 4, entitled "Responses," outlines responses to actual and hypothetical objections to the book's main arguments.
Chapter One (as well as the Preface) provides a straightforward overview of the book. In Chapter Two, Lessig introduces the book's four themes and illustrates them by means of four stories; the themes are 1) Regulability, 2) Regulation by Code, 3) Competing Sovereigns, and 4) Latent Ambiguity.18 Lessig explains, "[m]y aim in the balance of this book is to work through the issues raised by these four themes" (p. 19). As Lessig says, he uses the four themes to "understand cyber space as it is" and as "[he] believe[s] it is becoming" (p. 23).
Below, I first set out and evaluate the thirteen propositions (positive and normative) which I argue provide a logical foundation to Lessig's main themes. Since propositions are more specific than Lessig's "themes" (propositions have truth values, themes do not), this analytic device will facilitate clarity in the evaluation of the themes. 18. Pp. 19-23. Note that the first two themes, "R egulability," and "R egulation by code," correspond to the first two parts of the book, "R egulability," and "C ode and Other Regula tors."
BASIC PROPOSITIONAL STRUCTURE OF LESSIG'S ARGUMENT
The following set of propositions is meant to capture the intercon necting structure of the core arguments implicit in Lessig's four themes. In reading the propositions in the following summ ary form, note that they fall into a logical sequence. This sequence is implicit in the structure of Code. Lessig 12. Open source code ought to be promoted.
We Need An Internet Constitution
The three statements above that are italicized (numbers 7, 10, and 12) are "normative"-that is, "ought" statements, not "is" statements.
Hume's Law is sometimes stated as: An ought cannot be derived from 19. Themes "describe. " P. 8. Lessig's themes are nevertheless adaptive, as they make the book more accessible to a wider audience, which is an important goal of the book. Lessig says that his audience is second-generation netizens. P. xi. 20. For a definition and discussion of "Net95," see infra text accompanying note 22.
[Vol. 98:1916 an is.21 The proper conception of Hume's Law, however, is that an ought statement cannot be derived merely from an is statement. Les sig does not explicitly characterize his leading assertions as either posi tive or normative. As we work through the set of propositions that embody his argument, however, it will be important to pay attention to the connections he draws between the "ises" and the "oughts."
In the following discussion, I evaluate, independently and then in conjunction with each other, each of the thirteen propositions that to gether constitute the core arguments of the book.
Net95 was Unregulable
Lessig discusses what he refers to as "Net95," which is what the Internet was like, circa 1995.22 The most significant feature of Net95 was that it was a world that could not be controlled. It is this Internet that libertarians have in mind. Lessig sets out three structural ele ments that were conspicuously absent in Net95. These are "creden tials," "labels" and "zones" (p. 28). As Lessig notes, these elements can either be seen as "features" or "imperfections," depending on whether one favors increased regulability of the Internet (p. 27).
Net95 lacked information about users' identities (p. 28). By identi fication, Lessig means all the true facts about a person, such as "your name, your sex, where you live, what your education is, your driver's license number ... " (pp. 30-31). "Authentication" is the process by which aspects of your identity become known (p. 31). Net95 did not have an architecture that allowed people to authenticate personal facts that are not self-authenticating.23 Some personal facts are self authenticating. Lessig argues that in the physical world, many facts are self-authenticating or easily authenticated. In cyberspace, how ever, at least with regard to Net95, personal facts are not self authenticating (pp. 32-33). For facts that are not self-authenticating, 22. See pp. 25-27. Lessig states that the computer network that previously existed at the University of Chicago exemplifies Net95. P. 27. He had direct acquaintance with this sys tem, as he was teaching at the University of Chicago when this system was in place.
23. See p. 31. "Authentication" is the process by which aspects of your identity become known •.
•• If I walk into a bank, the teller will know a Jot about me even if I don't say a thing: he will know I'm a puffy, middle-aged white guy with glasses and blondish hair; he will know I'm not big and not strong .... He will know all this whether I want to tell him or not .
•.. Hiding usually does not hide itself very well; usually we reveal that we are hiding. P. 31. Lessig gives the example of the University of Chicago system. The architecture re quired no credentials; thus, it was "both easy to hide that you [were] a dog and hard to prove that you were not." P. 33.
Lessig argues that new architectures are quickly evolving on the Inter net that will make them capable of authentication. These are "creden tials." Lessig examines three forms of credentialing currently found on the Internet, which are "passwords," "cookies," and "digital certifi cates."24 A second feature that defined Net95 was an absence of labels. While it is true that the packets of data that sail across the Internet are labeled in the sense of having an Internet Protocol (IP) address,25 be yond that, they could contain anything at all. Under Net95, there was no system for obtaining verifiable information about the data on the Net because such data traveled unlabeled.26
The third core feature of Net95 -the absence of zones -tied the first two together. Because there was no simple way either to know who someone was or to classify data, there was no simple way to make access to data depend on who the user was, or on the data to which she or he wanted access. As Lessig says, under Net95, there was "no simple way to zone cyberspace."27 These three features in combination made Net95 largely unregula ble, a dream telecosm by libertarian lights. Lessig accounts for this lack of regulability as an unintended consequence of the early exigen-24. Pp. 34-35. Each of these three credentials provides a means to identify someone on the Internet. Typically, a "password" is a word or number that is kept secret. The user en ters the password along with her account name in order to verify that the user is authori2ed to use the system. Manufacturers are experimenting with biometric devices such as thumb print readers and retina scanners to link particular individuals to particular machines. P. 57. A "cookie" is a small bit of data entered by your browser to a "cookie file" on your hard drive. Websites that you visit initiate these cookies so that when you return to the site, they can recognize you because the cookie is sent by your browser to the website along with the request for the site. Like the above two technologies, "digital certificates" serve to identify you on the Internet. Digital certificates provide and certify more detailed information, how ever, such as citi2enship, age, occupation, gender, etc.
25. IP addresses are the bits of data that allow packets of information to move from one place to another on the Net. They look like this: 394.64.85.666. Basically, IP addresses function like postal addresses, saying from where the packet is coming and to where the packet is going.
26. See p. 28 ("Pictures of flesh come across a screen, but the system cannot tell whether the pictures are medical photos or pornography. Data about bodily functions come across the wire, but the system cannot tell whether the data are from medical records or a novel .... Net95 had no requirement that data be labeled.").
27. P. 28 (emphasis omitted). Lessig argues that zoning techniques will lead to previously unimagined abilities to regulate the Web. He writes:
The effect, in short, would be to zone cyberspace based on the qualifications carried by individual users. It would enable a degree of control of cyberspace that few have ever imagined. Cyberspace would go from being an unregulable space to, depending on the depth of the certificates in the space, the most regulable space imaginable. P. 57 (emphasis omitted).
(Vol. 98:1916 cies of the largely research-oriented academic community that devel oped the Internet.28
Libertarians Believe the Internet is Unregulable by Nature
Chapter Three is entitled, "Is-isms," which, according to Lessig, is the fallacy of thinking that because something is a certain way, it must stay that way (p. 25). According to Lessig, this fallacy is widespread among, indeed characteristic of, the Internet community when it comes to their belief in the unregulability of the Internet (p. 4). Lessig compares what he calls the "libertarian utopianism" of the Net to what he found in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s.29 This commu nity sees the Internet as an unregulated space, and implicitly thinks its destiny is to remain that way.
3.
The Internet is Regulable
As mentioned earlier, Lessig's first theme is "regulability." As the form of cognate chosen suggests, the book provides a discussion of "regulability" understood so as to be applicable to systems. With re gard to the Internet, Lessig argues that while the Internet was un regulable in 1995, it is advancing rapidly toward a state of greater regulability. Lessig explores in detail the great extent to which each of the three features missing from Net95 can be laid onto the architecture of the Internet as it currently exists. Lessig argues convincingly that it will be in the interest of electronic commerce to code in all three of these features, credentials, labels, and zones, in order to create more sophisticated marketplaces in cyberspace (p. 42).
For the lay libertarians who peopled early cyberspace, the absence of these three features made for a free and open electronic space in which people could quietly come and go as they pleased. In this early period, the Internet was noncommercial and without markets. For the assembling titans of wired capitalism, however, the lack of credentials, labels, and zones are serious obstacles to their business models and ac cordingly must be overcome. Lessig argues that it is through tech nologies of identification and authentication that users will be creden tialed, and data credentialed and labeled, such that cyberspace will be 28. Seep. 33 ("This minimalism in design is intentional. It reflects both a political deci sion about disabling control and a technological decision about the optimal network design. The designers were not interested in advancing social control; they were concerned with network efficiency. ").
29. Seep. 4 ("As in post-Communist Europe, first thoughts about cyberspace tied free dom to the disappearance of the state. But here the bond was even stronger than in post Communist Europe. The claim now was that government could not regulate cyberspace, that cyberspace was essentially, and unavoidably, free.") (emphasis omitted).
capable of being effectively zoned (p. 57). This process is already un der way such that cyberspace becomes more regulable every day.30
Computer code provides the means to make the Internet more regulable, and electronic commerce provides the incentive (p. 42). Lessig argues that the commercial development of the Internet is cre ating the main pressure pushing toward greater regulability. The above three features of Net95 each facilitate electronic commerce.31 Therefore:
Libertarians Hold a Faulty Conception Regarding the Nature of the Internet
As just discussed, Lessig demonstrates that while it is true that the Internet was unregulable in 1995, by the time he was completing the book in 1999, the Net had become substantially more regulable (pp. 43-60). Libertarians, however, think that the Net is unregulable by na ture (p. 5). If Net95 was unregulable and Net99 is becoming regulable, then obviously the Net does not have an essential nature when it comes to regulability. Libertarians who think otherwise are simply wrong.
To evaluate the conclusion that Lessig draws in Proposition Four (that the libertarians are wrong regarding regulability), it is necessary to evaluate each of the premises-propositions one through three. Proposition one, that Net95 was unregulable, is in need of qualifica tion. Lessig defines regulability as the "capacity of a government to regulate behavior within its proper reach" (p. 19). Note that this defi nition makes no requirement that regulability come by means of com puter code for advanced methods of identification and authentication of the sort described by Lessig. In other words, regulability, as generi cally understood, allows scope for low-tech means of regulability as well as high-tech means of regulability.
Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") pro vides a low tech means of increasing regulability.32 It creates safe har bors from copyright liability for Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Because ISPs play a leading role with regard to the Internet, creating safe harbors for many of their activities is an important instance of statutory regulation of the Internet. Yet, the means by which the safe 30. See Deborah M. Thaw, Th e Net Makes Notaries More Necessary, Not Less, Bus. WK., Dec. 13, 1999, at 18 (arguing that current business dealing demands identity assurance).
31. See p. 30 ("As the Net is being remade to fit the demands of commerce, architec tures are being added to make it serve commerce more efficiently. Regulability will be a by product of these changes. ").
32. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). Title II of the Act is known as the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act.
[Vol. 98:1916 harbor provisions work is low-tech, requiring none of the sophisticated architectural devices discussed by Lessig. Thus, low-tech means of Internet regulation may produce dramatic results in terms of regula bility. 33 Low-tech means of regulability of this sort were available un der Net95. Hence, it is not the case that Net95 was unregulable. Proposition one is incorrect.
Proposition two, which holds that libertarians think that the Net is unregulable, is also in need of qualification. When Lessig talks about libertarians, he is generally not referring to academic libertarians but rather to the large and influential cohort within the Internet commu nity who are libertarian in their political views regarding the Internet.34 With regard to this lay libertarian political community, Proposition two is correct. Lessig is right that it has been, and remains, common for Internet cognoscente to state that the Internet is not capable of regulation. And many others, who do not go quite this far, neverthe less maintain that government regulation of the Internet, while per haps not impossible, is nevertheless a bad idea.
With regard to academic cyber-libertarianism, however, the picture is more scrambled. David Post and David Johnson hold the view that Lessig criticizes.35 Richard Epstein, however, explicitly distinguishes 34. Seep. 85 & n.l (" 'Libertarian,' however, has a specific meaning for us. It associates \vith arguments against government. " "Or more precisely, against a certain form of govern ment regulation (in cyberspace).").
35. Lessig begins Chapter Three with the following epigram, which he says exemplifies the sort of libertarian view he has in mind: "The rise of an electronic medium that disre gards geographical boundaries throws the law into disarray by creating entirely new phe nomena that need to become the subject of clear legal rules but that cannot be governed, satisfactorily, by any current territorially based sovereign. " P. 24 (quoting David R. Johnson his flavor of libertarianism from Lessig's characterization. 36 We see then that Proposition two is true for the lay-libertarian community but only partially true for the academic-libertarian community.37
As already stated, Proposition three is correct, the Net is indeed becoming more regulable. The question then is whether the conclu sion stated in Proposition four follows from Propositions one through three, once Propositions one and two have been qualified. The answer is yes. While Net95 was not unregulable in the broad sense indicated by Lessig's definition of regulability, it was nevertheless difficult to regulate (or regulable only·in a perhaps less effective low-tech sense), so Proposition one is close to true. And most, if not all, libertarians mistakenly thought the Net's unregulability was an immutable feature. So Proposition two is substantially true as well. Since Proposition three is correct in holding that the Internet is regulable, it follows that libertarians have an incorrect conception regarding the regulability of the Internet.
The conclusion Lessig draws in Proposition four is both logically valid and true. Lessig is not interested in making this point for its own sake. His larger concern is to argue that the common libertarian mis conception is dangerous, as blindness to the problem entails inatten tion to the problem. Lessig writes, But there is "libertarianism" in the ivory tower and there is "libertarianism" on the ground. I recognize the species that Richard describes; I am a permanent resident of the ivory tower. But my book describes a present political attitude, not the ivory tower. It is about a present political reality, and a present rhetorical push. I am describing it because I have been watching it for the past six years. In that world, if someone argued (as Richard does above) that a "law of privacy" was needed, as well as law protecting trade secrets; that laws regu lating libel and slander were necessary, as well as a law regulating blackmail; if one even raised the issue of taxation, or suggested that the government was needed to "secure the in frastructure," then one would not be a "libertarian. [Vol. 98:1916 on "sensible libertarianism." But an attack on a certain do-nothingness that pervades our present political culture.38
Lessig's argument and conclusion here are important.
Code is the Most Important Regulator of the Internet
The second "theme" of the book is "regulation by code." Lessig states that this second theme should be considered in conjunction with Theme one, "regulability." In Lessig's words, "the regulability de scribed by the first theme depends on the code described in the sec ond" (p. 20; emphasis omitted). Lessig nestles this account of regula tion by code within a more general account of social regulation.39
Lessig identifies four main forces affecting social regulation: law, markets, norms, and architecture (p. 88). Lessig says we should think of each as a distinct modality of regulation (p. 88). What the modali ties have in common is that each serves as a "constraint" on behavior (p. 88). Laws constrain behavior by making certain activities illegal (p. 89). Markets constrain by making certain behaviors more expensive (p. 89). Norms constrain by making certain behaviors subject to in formal yet often potent social sanctions (p. 235). Finally, code (archi tecture) constrains behavior by creating architectural structures that constrain behavior (pp. 89-90).
In cyberspace, code is the most important regulator (p. 86). As Lessig says, in the late twentieth century and into the twenty-first, it is code that should be our concern (p. 86). While the role of code is sali ent as never before, it is not Lessig's argument that we focus exclu sively on code. Rather, we need to implement a more general under standing of how regulation works, one that accounts for the increasingly important role played by code. 40 Code is an important regulator in cyberspace for the obvious but profound reason that code is what provides the raw material out of which cyberspace is built. Cyberspace simply would not exist without this code. Hume famously refers to causation as the cement of the universe.41 Picking up on this, Jon Bister refers to social norms as the cement of society.42 For Lessig, code is the cement of cyberspace. In 38. Lessig, Real-World Libertarians and the Net, supra note 10, 'll 'll 8-9. 39. Lessig develops this account more fully in the appendix to the book. See pp. 235-39. 40. In Chapter 7, in which Lessig Jays out his account of social regulation, he provides a number of diagrams that are meant to capture the individual persons buffeted about by the four forces impinging from all four directions. In the center of these forces, the individual is represented by a "dot. " Curiously, Lessig refers to the dots (us) as "pathetic." P. 86 42. See generally ELSTER, supra note 7.
fact, as Lessig reminds us, there is not one cyberspace possible but many, and the constitutive diff erence is code.43
The Internet Embodies Values
According to Lessig, not only does code provide the raw materials, it also determines the normative character of cyberspace. One of the most important features of architectural code is that it is not value neutral. To the contrary, different architectures promote different values. Lessig writes, "[w]hat distinguishes different parts of cyber space are the differences in the regulations effected through code. In some places life is fairly free, in other places controlled, and the dif ference between them is simply a difference in the architectures of control -that is, a difference in code" (p. 20). 45. See p. 83 ("At the University of Chicago, if you wanted access to the Internet, you simply connected your machine to jacks located throughout the university. Any machine with an Ethernet connection could be plugged into these jacks. Once connected, your ma chine had full access to the Internet -access, that is, that was complete, anonymous, and free." (footnote omitted)).
46. Seep. 26 ("You cannot connect your machine to the net at Harvard unless the ma chine is registered -licensed, approved, verified . . . . Once registered, all interactions with the network are monitored and identified to a particular machine .... ").
[Vol. 98:1916 Lessig pays the most attention to the space owned by America Online ("AOL"). Like Walt Disney before him, AOL CEO, Steve Case, seeks to provide an environment in which the values that his or ganization favors may flourish. AOL has a number of architectural features that are relevant to the values that adhere in its space. Each AOL account is allowed five screen names (p. 67). This architectural feature promotes anonymous, indeed pseudonymous, online activity.
As Lessig notes, anonymity may promote political expression (pp. [70] [71] [72] [73] . AOL's chat rooms, however, have a maximum of twenty-four participants, and, thus, it is not possible for members to address other members en masse.47 In addition, AOL has a general code of conduct that constrains certain sorts of behavior such as obscenity (p. 67). MOOs. It is a text-based virtual reality that is linked to over 5000 members from around the world. Upon entry into this virtual com munity, one is assigned a character, which can then build a life in this community.
Communities survive particular interactions, which means that characters may develop reputations through their behavior in various settings. Thus, in LamdaMOO, people are anonymous (like AOL) but can develop reputations (like Counsel Connect).49
47. See p. 68 ("There is no town hall or town meeting where people can complain in public and have their complaints heard by others. There is no space large enough for citi zens to create a riot. The owners of AOL, however, can speak to all. Steve Case, the "town mayor," writes "chatty" letters to the members.").
48. A MUD is typically defined as a multi-user dungeon or multi-user domain. 
Liberty is an Important Value that Ought to be Respected and Promoted
Lessig clearly holds liberty to be an important value. He does not explicitly provide normative arguments to this effect, however, but rather assumes it to be so. This assumption is reasonable, given that Lessig is interested in studying the effects of increased regulability on fundamental values. Liberty certainly is a fundamental value, the word itself appearing in both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.50
Nor does Lessig provide explicit arguments to support the norma tive conclusion that liberty ought to be respected and promoted. Given the moral logic of value statements, however, Lessig is justified to make this assumption, for to hold that a value is a value, is, other things equal, to hold that the value ought to be respected and pro moted. This is simply the meaning of holding a value.
There is an Inverse Correlation Between Regulability and Liberty
A related theme of the book is that increased regulability will result in decreased liberty. Again, Lessig does not say much that di rectly establishes this point. Perhaps it simply seems obvious. Alter natively, he may see this proposition naturally following his concep tion of regulation, which is defined in terms of constraints (p. 217). More regulability means more constraints, which, by definition, means less freedom, as freedom is reasonably construed as an absence of constraints.51 Therefore:
The Internet is Diminishing in its Capacity to Promote Liberty
The logic of Lessig's argument, then, is that because electronic commerce is leading to increased regulability, and because increased regulability causes a loss of liberty, electronic commerce is causing the Internet to be a less free place. The argument has a proper form. Hence, unless one or more of the premises is false, Lessig's important conclusion should be accepted. Let us begin with Proposition five, which holds that code is the most important regulator of cyberspace. This is an overstatement.
U.S. CONST. preamble & amend. V; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
51. While his focus is on liberty, Lessig contends that increased regulability will have an adverse impact on other values as well. He writes, "Perfect authentication would mean that others know for certain all the fa cts about you; happiness comes from others knowing a good deal less." P. 31.
[Vol. 98:1916 Lessig does indeed provide strong reason to believe that code is an important regulator. He does not, however, say anything that would establish that it is the most important regulator. In particular, he does not pay attention to important non-architectural means of regulating the Internet, such as Title II of the DMCA and the other Internet related statutes cited earlier, none of which regulates computer code.s2 There is no reason to think that traditional methods of regulation, such as those recently employed by the American and Chinese gov ernments, will not continue to be the predominant means to regulate cyberspace.s3 Given this fact, one is not compelled to accept the claim that code is the most important regulator of cyberspace without more evidence or argument.
Proposition six holds that the Internet embodies values. This bare proposition is uncontroversially true. Lessig's subtle discussion of the various contexts in which this is true serves, however, to highlight the importance of this claim, as the more we understand how the Internet embodies values, the better position we will be in to shape these val ues.
Proposition seven holds that liberty is an important value that ought to be respected and promoted. While some moral theories would reject this proposition, most mainstream moral theories indeed recognize the central importance of liberty, although there will of course be disagreement on whether liberty is ultimately grounded con sequentially or deontologically.s4 Thus, Proposition seven is not in need of qualification.
Proposition eight holds that there is an inverse correlation between regulability and liberty. This premise is subject to question. The pur ported inverse correlation appears to be based on the claim that, as a general matter, the less e-commerce entities know about you the bet ter off you will be.ss While this claim is not analytically true, there are indeed many instances in which the possession of your information by . Nothing Lessig says in the book indicates conclu sively whether he is a consequentialist or deontologist. Some of his remarks indicate sensi tivity to welfarist concerns. See pp. 146-47. Generally speaking, however, the preoccupation with liberty and freedom sounds in deontology, as these are typically non-instrumentalist values by the lights of mainstream moral and political theory. It is reasonable to assume, then, that Lessig is some sort of deontologist who places great importance on the value of liberty. What is not clear is whether he is the sort of deontologist who thinks duties and rights can be traded off against consequentialist considerations, even if the former are not reducible to the latter.
55. See supra note 51. others can hinder individual freedom. The most significant single ex ample along these lines is Julie Cohen's argument that loss of the abil ity to read anonymously threatens the core First Amendment value of freedom of conscience and thought.56
The relationship between regulability and freedom is more com plex, however, than is suggested by Lessig's analysis. While it is true that you may be harmed by others' possession of your data, you may also be helped. Code would benefit from a discussion of the consumer surplus that may accrue to society due to increased regulability.57 For example, casual empirical observation supports the claim that many people are happy to exchange personal information for benefits re ceived in return. Grocery stores that offer discounts for card holders have no trouble establishing card-holder relationships despite the fact that this bargain entails the release of purchasing data to the store's sophisticated personal data-tracking system. Many people are quite happy to take part in this particular market in personal data.58 It would be odd to contend that people who choose to do so are some how less free than those who choose not to.59 Freedom is measured in your ability to choose, not in what you choose.60 56. See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1012 {1996) ("The freedom to read anonymously is just as much a part of our tradition, and the choice of reading materials just as expressive of identity, as the decision to use or withhold one's name."). In discussing the "Cohen Theorem," Lessig offers an example from when he was a student at an English uni versity. While there, he made several purchases of Scotch as gifts. When he returned to school, a tutor asked him about his excessive purchasing of alcohol. Pp. 138-39 (" [N] ow that monitoring can occur, we must ask whether the latent right to read anonymously, given to us before by imperfections in technologies ! should be a legally protected right.").
57. Note that the benefits need not be consequentialist goods whose benefit comes at the expense of liberty. One's access to online media may make one more enlightened, more autonomous, and, hence, freer.
58. See Computer-Dating the Customer, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 4, 1995 at R7.
The bare fact that this practice exists does not show that it is efficient, however, as there may be market failure. While there may be market failure, there also may not be market failure. Lessig does not discuss which of these possibilities is more likely to be true. Are Americans, in general, freer now than they were a hundred years ago? Even if this question is meaningful, the answer is certainly unclear. The answer would not be unclear, however, if there was a direct correlation between Joss of informational privacy and Joss of freedom, because we have dramatically less informational privacy than we had a century ago.
60. See generally GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACI1CE OF AUTONOMY {1988).
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It will not be an adequate response to note that people trade away their data out of ignorance of the consequences. While this is no doubt true, it is also true that people not ignorant in this manner trade away their data. Lessig himself trades away data by his acceptance of cookies in his web browser.61 Plausibly, this shows that Lessig prefers the benefits he gets from unrestricted Internet browsing over the con sequent loss to his informational privacy. While it is true that unless one provides some data, many interesting websites will be inaccessible, this does not make the provision of data in these circumstances any more coercive than when one is required to pay admission to enter a movie or ball game. 6 2 Lessig implicitly acknowledges the potential compatibility between liberty and regulability in the chapter entitled "Privacy" in Part Three of the book, in which he applies the book's earlier arguments in par ticular contexts. Lessig promotes a regime of user self-help to secure Internet privacy, such as might be supplied by emerging technologies such as P3P (p. 160). P3P allows client browsers to perform automatic electronic negotiations with websites, based on the privacy preferences of the user and the privacy policies of the website. Such transactions have the potential to make both users and websites better off.
We see, then, that on one plausible conception of freedom, the contractarian model, consumers may express their free desires when they bargain into a situation of increased regulability. This means that there is not a simple inverse correlation between regulability and free dom. Greater regulability may just mean an architecture that allows for more and better opportunities for bargaining.63 Accordingly, the conclusion as stated in Proposition nine, that cyberspace is diminishing liberty, is not established. Nor has the negation of this proposition been established. More study into the relationship between regulabil ity and liberty is needed. 63. In a free and fair market, for example, people may choose to carry digital credentials in order to conduct the sort of electronic commerce functions that are fa cilitated by these credentials.
The Trend Toward Increased Regulability of the Internet
Ought to be Reversed
From the above set of propositions, Lessig draws a second norma tive conclusion. By combining the premise that liberty is a fundamen tal value that ought to be respected and promoted with the premise that cyberspace is becoming less free due to increased regulability, Lessig concludes that the trend toward increased regulability ought to be reversed (pp. 52, 56, 108).64
By the lights of the discussion in the previous section, however, it should be clear that this conclusion does not follow because the prem ise holding that increased regulability leads to decreased freedom has not been established. Thus, it may not be necessary to reverse the trend toward greater regulability in order to promote liberty. What matters in terms of promoting liberty is that future states of greater regulability are the result of autonomous processes.
Open Source Code is Less Regulable than Closed (Proprietary) Source Code
Lessig argues that open code will be less subject to regulability than proprietary code.65 Lessig claims that open source code will make top-down control harder but will allow for bottom-up control (p. 20). Lessig's argument for why open code will promote unregulability and hence liberty is simple but powerful. The basic idea is that impor tant proprietary code will likely be owned by large commercial entities who will be easily susceptible to governmental attempts to alter code to serve governmental interests.66 Lessig gives the example of 64. Depending on the underlying value theory one assumes, the fact that liberty is an important value will not be enough to draw any necessary practical inferences solely based on the existence of a serious threat to liberty. The reason is that by the lights of prominent and respected theories, a diminution in liberty may be morally permissible if it is the result of some moral or policy choice that pursues a distinct sort of benefit or sorts of benefits that, all things considered, balances out the liberty concern. If the proper normative account re qu ires trade-offs, then Lessig must countenance the possibility that a diminution in liberty is justified by the fa ct that the proposed state of affairs promotes other values. This is more than a theoretical possibility, if we are to judge based on the current growth in the market in personal data, a significant and growing part of which is occurring pursuant to consensual practices. See Hetcher, supra note 62. Lessig has to respect the fa ct that mainstream Inter net users today may not pine after Net95 the way that first-generation users did. Freedom may simply mean the autonomy to indulge even more conspicuously in the fa tuous materi alism that constitutes much of contemporary American life.
65. P. 107 ("To the extent that code is open code, the power of government is con strained . . . . [W] hen the target of its regulation is plastic, it cannot rely on its target re maining as it wants.").
66. P. 52 ("But as code writing becomes commercial -as it becomes the product of a smaller number of large companies -the government ' s ability to regulate it increases."). Lessig also writes "[t]he code is regulable only because the code writers can be con- 
Open Source Code Ought to be Promoted
Because open source code is less regulable than closed source code, and regulability is inversely related to liberty, and liberty is a value that ought to be promoted, open source code ought to be pro moted.70 Subject to the qualifications noted above about the relation ship between regulability and liberty, this is a valid argument, which moves from plausible premises to a plausible conclusion. And given how high the stakes are -liberty in cyb erspace -an important con clusion as well.
We Need An In ternet Constitution
Encouraging open source code is Lessig's main concrete prescrip tion for promoting a constitutional regime for cyb erspace that respects and promotes liberty.71 Lessig provides little by way of detail as to how a world of open source code might be accomplished. Unfortu nately for his reader, Lessig may be precluded from doing so by a con flict of interest, as such a discussion could hardly fail to discuss Micro soft. Lessig does not discuss the Microsoft antitrust litigation that was ongoing at the time of the publication of the book. This is appropriate and expected given Lessig's ongoing role in the litigation. 72 There is a deep tension between open code and Microsoft's busi ness model, which is that its software runs the world.73 Microsoft's business model is precisely that there not be open source code but rather that the dominant (or exclusive) code of cyberspace be a pro prietary Microsoft product. While the remark is often made offhand, it does, indeed, appear that Bill Gates wants to control cyberspace. 74 Lessig wants no one to control cyberspace. 75 [Vol. 98:1916 Lessig argues that, in order to systematically and democratically deal with issues such as open code, we need to enter a period of consti tution building. Lessig recommends that we create a constitution for cyberspace.76 Recall that for Lessig, the word "constitution" is to be understood in the British not the American sense. On this definition, constitution building involves both governmental and nongovernmen tal action.
On the broad account of constitution, then, what Lessig is really saying is that we would do well to implement a justified social order for cyberspace. Considered first at this general level, this claim is highly plausible. Disagreement will come when we begin to fill in the detail as to what in particular the constitutional order should look like. Lessig does not provide details as to what the overarching features of this order should be. Doing so would be an entire project in itself. Lessig's main point is preliminary to this discussion. Before creating a constitution, there must first be the recognition that one is needed. This is the story of Code.
The reader comes away unclear on whether Lessig is proposing that the constitutional order grow out of the U.S. legal system or in stead that it evolve as a form of world government. Throughout the book, Lessig uses the term "we." It appears that "we" means we Americans. Does this mean that we Americans are supposed to create the constitution for cyberspace? This is problematic, of course, as the Internet is global.
Lessig suggests that we should choose to develop a new constitu tion for this space, just as the American Founders and Russians had to (pp. 4-8). But there are already constitutions in place that pertain to cyberspace. China just announced rules to govern its space.77 Despite the fact that the official U.S. policy is to support industry self regulation, the United States has been regulating the Internet.78 While early attempts at regulating the Internet may have been unsuccessful, it is unlikely that this will cause the United States to cease trying. This may make the issue of founding a new social order to govern the Internet beside the point. In the United States alone, regulation of the 76. Lessig thinks it is natural and proper that the state should play an integral role in the process of constitution building in cyberspace. This will probably strike the typical reader of this Review as uncontroversial, but the crowd that Lessig most wants to convince on this par ticular point is not constituted of the readers of this Review but rather the influential liber tarian contingent of the Internet policy community. These are libertarians staunchly op posed to all state involvement. See supra note 34.
77. See supra note 33.
78. See , e. g., Anticybersquatting Act, supra note 33; NET Act, supra note 33; § 230 of the CDA, supra note 33; DMCA, supra note 32. These statu te s are operative only because they pass muster under the U.S. Constitution.
Internet has arguably moved past the point where a founding of a new order could be possible.
Nor does the broad need for a justified social order for cyberspace entail the desirability of new constitutional amendments or federal statutes.
Indeed, a grundnorm of the Internet has been self regulation. Lessig is right that there is no necessary reason to prefer informal social solutions. Nevertheless, informal solutions have a sig nificant role to play. Lessig is also right that anarcho-libertarianism is overly antigovernment in allowing no role for the government. The government plays a fundamental role in providing legal order. Legal order, however, is only one aspect of social order.
Lessig argues that the Constitution is thin; it does not adequately stretch to cyberspace (p. 22) . Two brief responses are worth men tioning, although the topic merits greater discussion than can be pur sued here. The first is that the bare fact that there are examples in which the U.S. Constitution does not apply snugly to Internet facts is certainly not enough reason to conclude that the larger U.S. legal sys tem is not capable of dealing with the Internet. In particular, common law processes have done reasonably well so far in adapting to the Internet.79 So has the FTC, which has recently fostered industry self regulation regarding website provision of privacy policies.80 Second, there has not been enough time to tell. For example, the FTC had made clear that it thinks more time is needed with respect to self regulatory efforts regarding informational privacy online.81
Lessig does not point out that open source code is currently being driven by commercial entities.82 While open code may be highly desir able, it may still be the case, then, that the best provider of it is the market and norms, not the state. 82 See, e.g ., "Red Hat Reinforces Commitment to Open Source, Releases Source Code for Popular Source-Navigator lOE" (press release) available at <ltttp://www.redhat.com/ about/ 2000/press_sourcemav.html>.
